also usually the source of their disillusionment, and subsequently, a main reason to disengage from violent extremism -providing that they are able to do so.
Individuals who have been involved in violent Jihad or in other types of terrorist activities
come from a diversity of social backgrounds und have undergone rather different processes of violent radicalisation. There is no single terrorist profile or a single root cause which is behind radicalisation into terrorism [1, 3, 8, 10:810, 18] . 1 These understandings have led many observers to make two negative conclusions: 1) profiling in order to identify possible terrorists does not work; 2) some will also argue that it is futile to try to develop strategies for preventing these diverse radicalisation processes as no such measures will be able to fit them all.
However, it is possible that if one size does not fit them all, tailor-made interventions might be developed. We will come back to that possibility later. [19] stated: ‗What we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Of the 4 individuals here, 3 were second generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin and one whose parents were of Jamaican origin; [one] was an Algerian failed asylum seeker; [another] had an English mother and Jamaican father. Others of interest have been white converts. Some have been well-educated, some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently well integrated in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with children. Some previously lawabiding, others with a history of petty crime. In a few cases there is evidence of abuse or other trauma in early life, but in others their upbringing has been stable and loving' [19: 31] .
For example, the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005
Profiling in order to identify specific individuals involved in terrorism or vulnerable to radicalisation into violence by narrowing down from a wider population turns out to be of limited use, producing too many false positives as well as false negatives: people who fit the stereotype of (potential) terrorists without being a (potential) terrorist; and real terrorists who go undetected because they do not fit the stereotype. Profiling of dimensions, processes and pathways is far a more promising approach [12:60, 13] . By understanding these various processes and pathways there may also be some openings for identifying possible preventive interventions which may be used to disrupt processes of radicalisation into violence and facilitating disengagement.
Several studies of diverse types of violent groups have -at least to some extent -been able to identify a limited number of types of persons involved in violent groups, and which are characterised by different background factors and paths of radicalisation. A German study by Helmut Willems [22, 23] classified perpetrators of xenophobic violence into four main varieties: ‗Right-wing activists', ‗Ethnocentric youths', ‗Criminal youths', and ‗Fellow-travellers'. These were characterised by different profiles in terms of political/ideological motivation, organisational affiliation, socio-economic background, education, criminal records, and the use of violence. A study of Jihadi terrorist cells in Europe by Petter Nesser [15, 16, 17] found that these cells typically consisted of four main categories of terrorist cell members -the entrepreneur, the protégé, the misfit and the drifter. Each type had different socio-economic background and related to ideology and politics in different ways.
Interestingly, these two typologies are in full agreement in describing three of the four types of activists, even if the political and ideological orientations of these groups are very different.
However, a problem with typologies or profiles based on static ideal types is that many individual activists do not fit in, or they fall between the ideal types and become indistinct. Different extremist or terrorist groups may also be described as consisting of diverse mixtures of people who at any moment in time are placed at various ends of the continuum. Thus, some groups may have a large proportion of leaders and followers at the ideological and socially well adapted ends of the continuums. Other groups may start out with only a few of these as leaders and a larger proportion of marginalised and apolitical followers, some of whom may gradually become more politicised. These different types of individuals will usually perform different and complementary roles within each group [2:48-51].
Thus, the types described here, partly based on the typologies of Willems [23] (refined by Bjørgo [2] ) and Nesser [17] should not be considered as static profiles but rather as positions which individuals to various extents may move towards or away from within processes of radicalisation or deradicalisation -although some of their individual traits and qualities may tie them more firmly to some positions than to others.
What follows from the understanding that terrorist groups may consist of different types of individuals who undergo diverse paths of radicalisation is not that it is futile to develop strategies of prevention to target all these diverse types. Rather, it follows that it is necessary to develop several specific measures which may fit each separate type or dimension. Some of these types are susceptible to socio-economic interventions, others to psycho-social factors and others to ideological and political issues. Thus, preventive strategies have to be tailored to the specific drivers behind each main type of activist and the specifics of the various groups.
The different dimensions described above may help us to suggest several points of intervention in order to induce different types of (potential) activists to break off their processes of radicalisation or to disengage from the militant group they have been part of.
Different strategies of prevention or intervention are likely to have different effects on different activists because they have different needs and vulnerabilities.
Thus, the types or profiles described here should not be considered as a tool to identify potential terrorists. They should rather be seen as an aid to develop more specific and targeted strategies for preventing violent radicalisation and facilitating disengagement, taking into account the diversity of violent activists. The profiles below should be understood as ideal types, but not as static positions, as the typology is based on dimensions which represent dynamic continuums. Thus, it follows that during their extremist careers individuals may move from resembling one type initially into acquiring more of the characteristics of other types at later stages.
Ideological activists
One particular type of radicalisation process characterises ideological activists who play leading roles in terrorist cells. They are often charismatic persons motivated by idealism and a strong sense of justice, responding to the suffering of others -be it fellow Muslims or other objects of identification, globally or locally. Jihadism or other varieties of political violence are embraced through an intellectual process where the need to take action gradually becomes a political or religious duty [17] . These altruistic persons are often resourceful, educated, well integrated and in some cases even considered as role models in their communities [21. 2 One particular variety is the experienced Jihadi veterans who have taken part in armed struggle at some of the war theatres for Jihad (such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia) and possess a certain heroic image as well as combat experience. They may also serve as linkages to the movement of global Jihad. Another and younger variety may be described as the protégé of the leader [17] . They tend to embrace Jihadism or other forms of militancy through a combination of loyalty to the leader and political activism. Although often intelligent, skilful and socially well adapted, they may also be impressionable and easily manipulated by the elders they look up to.
Those who score high on ideological and political motivation may become disillusioned when they realise that the group or struggle does not further their cause or improve the plights of the population they claim to fight for. Thus, although some wanted to fight for the cause of the Muslims, it might be troubling that eight times more Muslims than Westerners are killed by al-Qaida, according to some accounts [11, 14] . They might also be troubled by contradictions between violent means and political ends, from engaging in behaviour that conflicts with one's beliefs, or other forms of cognitive dissonance. Although hard to persuade, they might in such circumstances also be challenged on ideological grounds.
However, those who have scored high on leadership are also vulnerable to loss of status and confidence within the group. In such situations of status loss, the option of disengagement may become more attractive than when they were leaders everyone looked up to. Sometimes it might even be possible to -help‖ leaders to lose status and confidence within their milieu through various forms of intervention (e.g. by releasing discrediting information about them).
A combination of political disillusionment and loss of status or leadership role increases the likelihood of disengagement from the group and subsequent deradicalisation on the ideological level (which often is a gradual process). This may also be reinforced by a tendency towards exhaustion and burn-out among individuals who have been highly committed over a long period, in particular if they live under high pressure and danger.
There is also an added value when such leading people disengage because they may provide powerful messages to warn young people against joining such extremist movements, and may also open the path of disengagement for other discontent participants in the movement they belonged to. What made them leaders and spokesmen for radicalisation may also make them important leaders for disengagement and deradicalisation, having a special credibility due their experience. There are several prominent examples of this from (pro-)Jihadi groups as well as from neo-Nazi and other types of violent radical groups. Sometimes they also play important roles in establishing, figure-heading and/or running organisations or programmes for disengagement and deradicalisation, such as the Exit programmes for former neo-Nazis in Sweden and Germany, the Indonesian programme for rehabilitating members of Jema'a Islamiya, and the Quillam Foundation established by British ex-militant Islamists [7] .
Drifters and followers
For some youths, the experience of belonging to a group and being accepted by peers or Having high expectations about friendship, loyalty and comradeship, it will come as a strong disappointment that life in a militant group is often characterized by paranoia, distrust, backstabbing and betrayal. Pressure from outside and the fear of infiltration produce a strong sense of paranoia within the group, and this may often cause people to accuse one another of being infiltrators or potential traitors. Disseminating scandalous rumours and stories about other members is also a common practice in some extremist groups -in particular in some of the neo-Nazi groups I studied [2:217-219; see also 20:160].
A British militant Islamist, Maajid Nawaz, was arrested on his arrival to Egypt. He spent months and years rotting in an Egyptian prison. None of his friends in the Islamist movement ever tried to contact him or help him -he was left to his own destiny. The only ones who intervened on his behalf and tried to get him out was -surprise -Amnesty International.
When he was finally released, he left the Jihadist movement and became a co-founder of the Quilliam Foundation, a British think-tank working to counter violent radicalisation.
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For those primarily motivated by a need for belonging, alternative groups or new -significant others‖ might replace bonds to the radicalised group or cell. Devotion to a romantic partner outside the group or parental obligations for children may also lead the young person to leave the group due to conflicting loyalties and commitments and setting different priorities. 
Concluding remarks
The 
